They offer several responses to this: denial, counterargument, and distinction.

As for denial, they say: “We do not concede that this case is like that of the Zanj.”

As for counterargument, they counter this with our knowledge that every motion has an end, and every event has an end, yet motions and events collectively have no end; that every number is finite, yet numbers have no end; that each sister may individually be married, yet marrying sisters simultaneously is not permissible; that each individual unit among ten is one, and is one third of three and one quarter of four, whereas ten is neither one third of three nor one quarter of four; that each component of a composite is a single element, provided that the composite is not itself a single, simple entity; that each part of a circle is part of a circle, whereas the circle is not part of a circle; and that each constituent of rain is a drop, whereas the whole is not a drop—the whole is not a drop. A distinction must therefore be drawn between that which has a totality describable in the same terms as its individual members and that which has no totality that can be so described.

There is no doubt that, when we consider the proposition that every individual Zanj is black, we necessarily know that the Zanj collectively are black. This is because the totality is distinct from each individual member taken separately.

Sometimes it can be described by the attributes of its individual members, as when we say of events bounded at both ends that their totality has a beginning, just as each individual event has a beginning.