and because each one was preceded by its own nonexistence. If they had no beginning, the past would never have been free of either their existence or their nonexistence, and no distinction could be drawn between what precedes and what is preceded.”

I say:

This is the premise that their opponents have disputed, as illustrated by some of the criticisms already mentioned in the discussions of al-Rāzī and others.

These opponents say that they do not concede that, if each individual event has a beginning, their totality must have a beginning—just as each has an end, whereas their totality has no end.

Likewise, each individual in a set of ten is one tenth of the whole, but the whole is not one tenth. Each of a person’s bodily members is a member, but the whole is not always so described. Rather, sometimes the whole possesses the same attribute as its individual members: if every part of a totality exists, the whole exists; if every part of the whole is contingent, the whole is contingent; and if every part of it is nonexistent, the whole is nonexistent. At other times, this is not the case, as explained above.

It must therefore be demonstrated which of these two categories the disputed case belongs to. Otherwise, asserting this merely restates the very point at issue and thus begs the question.

Their analogy with the Zanj is an analogy with a particular case. It does not establish the intended conclusion unless it is known that the two cases are alike.