I say:

This rests on the premise that whatever is not identical with a thing is other than it. This is the position of the Mu‘tazilah.

Those who affirm the divine attributes dispute this with them, saying: “An attribute is not described as either identical with Him or other than Him.” Their leading authorities do not say, “It is neither identical with Him nor other than Him,” because the term “other” is ambiguous. Many of them, however, do say, “It is neither identical with Him nor other than Him.”

Nevertheless, the argument still works on the basis that motion is not identical with the body and is temporally originated. It also works if one says: “Two things are other than one another if either can be separate from the other in time, place, or existence.” Motion is separate from the body with respect to existence, for the body may exist without having any motion.

But it may be said: We do not concede that every body can be devoid of motion altogether; rather, a particular motion may accompany it. They do not claim that a body necessarily entails a particular instance of motion or rest, but rather motion or rest as a kind.

Abū al-Husayn said:

“The proof that it is impossible for a body to precede motion and rest as a genus is that, were it to precede them, it would be neither stationary nor moving nor situated in a place, despite being a body occupying space. The impossibility of this is self-evident.”

He said:

“The proof that motion and rest are temporally originated is that every instance of motion or rest can cease to exist, whereas what is eternal cannot cease to exist. We say that instances of rest and motion can cease to exist because every moving body can either come to rest or be changed from one motion to another, as when the celestial sphere passes from one revolution to