Ibn Rushd said:

“As for the premise that will can produce only something that comes into being, this is not self-evident.

“Will in actuality accompanies the very act of bringing about what is willed, for will is relational. It has been established that when one of two correlatives exists in actuality, the other exists in actuality, as with father and son. When one exists potentially, the other exists potentially. Thus, if will in actuality comes into being, what is willed must also come into being; and if will in actuality is eternal, what is willed in actuality is eternal.

“As for will that precedes what is willed, this is potential will. I mean will whose object has not yet become actual, when that will is not accompanied by the act that brings its object into being. It is therefore evident that, when its object becomes actual, will has a mode of existence it did not have before its object became actual, since it causes its object to come into being through the mediation of action.

“Thus, if the theologians were to posit that will comes into being, what is willed would necessarily be brought into being.”

He said:

“The apparent sense of revelation is that it did not delve into such subtleties when addressing the general public