He said:

“The premise that will singles out one of two equivalent possibilities is correct. The premise that the world lies within a boundary enclosing it is false or not self-evident. His positing this void also entails something abhorrent in their view: that it is eternal, since, if it had come into being, it would require a void.”

I say:

His concession that will singles out one of two equivalent possibilities contradicts his earlier statement that there must be some wisdom requiring the existence of one effect rather than the other. Will is directed towards the effect because the one who wills knows that it embodies the wisdom sought.

Anyone holding this view cannot allow will to single out one of two equivalent possibilities. Rather, one must possess a distinguishing feature that requires will to be directed towards it. Otherwise, given their equality, one cannot be willed rather than the other according to this view.

Once this is conceded, it can be said that the agent’s choice alone—that is, his will—determined existence in one period rather than another, despite their equivalence, with one magnitude rather than another, and with one attribute rather than another.

As for his objection to the world’s lying within a boundary enclosing it, they do not need to establish a single existent entity within which the world is situated. Rather, they say:

“We know self-evidently that it could be situated to the right or to the left, even if what lies beyond it is sheer nonexistence.”

Calling this a “place” is like someone saying, “The world is in a place.” The terms “place,” “location,” and “spatial region” can refer either to something existent or to something nonexistent.