[Section]

If they say:

“When we say that existence is either necessary, its essence admitting of no nonexistence, or contingent, admitting of nonexistence, and that whatever admits of nonexistence must depend on a necessary existent, the necessary existent is established on either alternative, regardless of whether the contingent can be beginningless or not. Indeed, merely conceiving this reality—namely, that it admits of nonexistence—entails its dependence on an agent.”

The reply is: This is correct. However, this division does not entail that both categories actually exist unless the existence of the contingent is demonstrated. It does, however, establish on either alternative an existent that does not admit of nonexistence.

This does not contradict the claim that there is only one existent, which does not admit of nonexistence. The position of those who make this claim is refuted only when it is shown that existence includes something contingent that admits of nonexistence.

Merely making the division does not establish both categories. Both are established only when it is established that existence includes something contingent that admits of nonexistence, and this contingent existent must depend on a necessary existent.

The argument would then proceed from the existence of something known to be contingent to the beginningless. This is an inference from temporally originated things to the beginningless, not an inference from existence as such to the necessary existent, as Ibn Sīnā and his followers supposed, holding that existence as such