contingent, so nothing in this establishes a necessary existent.”

If you say:

“The contingent must have a necessary existent,”

you may be told:

“It is well known that whatever is temporally originated must have an agent. But as for what you have held to be beginningless and eternal, and have called contingent, it is not known that it needs an agent. Indeed, most rational people say that it is impossible for such a thing to have an agent. Even supposing that it had an agent, this could only be known through subtle and intricate reasoning. Establishing the necessary existent cannot therefore depend upon such a premise.”

If they say:

“We have already established that it is contingent, and the contingent must have a necessary existent,”

they may be told:

“You have made it contingent, beginningless, and eternal. According to the majority of rational people, this combines two contradictories and is impossible. An impossible premise may entail an impossible conclusion. All that your proof establishes is the existence of something beginningless and eternal, and this is true.

“Yet according to you, what is beginningless and eternal may be necessary or may be contingent. We do not know that this contingent existent needs a necessary existent. Thus, the existence of the necessary existent you claim does not follow, just as the existence of the contingent existent you claim did not follow.”

If you say:

“If this contingent existent is assumed not to exist, the existence of the other category—the necessary—must follow, since existence is confined to the necessary and the contingent, as we have explained,”

you may be told:

“Just as the existence of this contingent existent has not been shown to follow, neither has its nonexistence been established. Rather, doubt remains, even if its nonexistence is assumed.