They also disagree about the case in which it does not exist. Do they say, “It does not exist because its necessitating cause is absent,” or do they offer no causal explanation for its nonexistence? Rather, it has no existence of itself; its existence derives solely from its agent. If no agent brings it into being, it remains in its continuing state of nonexistence.

The disagreement here concerns terminology and how the matter is considered. The precise explanation is that the absence of its cause entails its nonexistence—not that the absence of its cause produces or necessitates its nonexistence, but that its nonexistence follows from the absence of its cause.

If by the cause of its nonexistence one means something that produces its nonexistence, then its continuing nonexistence requires nothing to produce it. But if one means something that entails its nonexistence, then there is no doubt that the absence of its cause entails its nonexistence.

These people say that contingent things are of two kinds: those that are contingent in relation to their agent, and those that are necessary in relation to their agent. Indeed, all existing contingent things are necessary in relation to their agent. Those contingent things that do not exist are contingent considered in themselves, but impossible through another.

Just as whatever contingent things exist are necessary through another, not in themselves, so those that do not exist are impossible through another, not in themselves. Whatever Allah wills comes to be, and whatever He does not will does not come to be. Whatever He wills to be must therefore be. It is not necessary in itself, nor does its existence derive from itself; rather, Allah brings it into being.