Thus, this premise stated by Abū al-Maʿālī is undoubtedly sound. The issue lies in establishing the second premise, which has been discussed elsewhere: does the determination of possible things in certain ways rather than others entail that they have a beginning?

Ibn Rushd said:
“We find that Ibn Sīnā, too, accepts this premise in a certain sense. He holds that every existent other than the agent, when considered in itself, is possible and contingent. These contingent things fall into two classes: one is contingent in relation to its agent; the other is necessary in relation to its agent but contingent in itself. The First Agent alone is necessary in every respect.”

He said:
“This position is utterly untenable, for what is contingent in itself and in its essence cannot be necessary by virtue of its agent. Otherwise, the nature of the contingent would become the nature of the necessary. If it is said, ‘By its being contingent in itself, we mean only that whenever its agent is supposed not to exist, it too would not exist,’ we reply, ‘This nonexistence is an impossibility entailed by another impossibility: the nonexistence of the efficient cause.’ This is not the place to discuss this man, but