and others, while affirming Allah’s will and volition, they also affirm His wisdom and mercy.

These philosophers criticized the Ashʿarīs for denying purposive wisdom, yet their own position entails an even greater inconsistency. For if they affirm purposive wisdom, as the majority of Muslims do, they must all the more affirm will: whoever brings something about for an end he desires must all the more intend the thing he brings about. If, despite this, they deny an agent who acts by choice and say, “He is a cause that necessitates its effect without any will,” this is utterly inconsistent.

Something greater than that. For if they affirm purposive wisdom, as the majority of Muslims do, they must all the more affirm will: whoever brings something about for an end he desires must all the more intend the thing he brings about. If, despite this, they deny an agent who acts by choice and say, “He is a cause that necessitates its effect without any will,” this is utterly inconsistent.

Whoever follows Abū al-Maʿālī’s approach in this argument need not deny wisdom. Rather, by affirming wisdom directed toward an intended end, he can all the more establish will.

Thus, the fact that the world has been given certain features rather than others indicates its Maker’s will, as well as His wisdom and His mercy, which entails His benefiting His creation and showing them kindness.

Accordingly, when we say that a configuration other than this one is possible, we mean that it is intrinsically possible, and that the Lord is capable of bringing about another configuration just as He is capable of bringing about this one.

That does not conflict with will and wisdom having singled out certain conceivable possibilities rather than others.