the causes of a thing. If a thing has no necessary causes requiring it to exist in the form in which its kind exists, then there is no knowledge peculiar to the wise Creator rather than anyone else. Likewise, if there were no necessary causes for the existence of artifacts, there would be no craftsmanship at all, nor any wisdom attributable to the craftsman rather than to someone who is not a craftsman.

What wisdom would there be in the human being if all his actions and activities could be performed through any organ whatsoever, or without an organ—if, for example, sight were possible through the ears just as through the eyes, and smell through the eyes just as through the nose?

All this negates wisdom and the meaning on account of which He has called Himself Wise. Exalted is He, and hallowed are His names, far above such things.

I say:

The substance of this argument is to affirm the wisdom and fitting purpose in existing things, corresponding to the distinctive properties assigned to each, and to affirm that the connection between certain things may be a condition of their existence or a condition of their perfection.

By affirming this, he proceeds to attack the argument of Abū al-Maʿālī and others like him, who affirm nothing beyond sheer will alone, which assigns each created thing its attributes and measure.

For this is a view held by some speculative theologians, such as the Ashʿarīs and the Zāhirīs, and by a group of jurists among the followers of the four imams.

As for the majority of Muslims