and coming to an end are one and the same.

But one may say of it that one thing existed before another without end. An endpoint is thus denied with respect to its beginning, not with respect to the direction in which it has reached an endpoint.

It is also said to be infinite in a qualified sense, not absolutely, as he stated. For one of their principles is that an infinity whose existence is possible is that beyond which something always exists—that is, something to which additions can always be made. This is what he calls an infinity whose existence is possible: there is something outside it, and additions can always be made to it. Yet it admits additions only in the direction in which it has reached an endpoint. It is therefore finite in one direction and infinite in the other.

For this reason, it is permissible to say that it is not infinite, since it is finite in one direction; and it is permissible to say that it is infinite, since it is not finite in the other direction.

Hence we say that nothing enters into existence except that whose existence has come to an end. Yet it has not come to an end—and nothing comes to an end unless its existence had a beginning—for if events are assumed to continue perpetually, without beginning or end, then they have not come to an end. A person merely supposes that the past has come to an end; what has truly come to an end is that of which nothing remains.

If events are continuous, they have neither come to an end nor reached an endpoint, and thus have not entered into