end, for one of their principles is that an infinity that can exist is one beyond which there is always something further—I mean that something can always be added to it. They posit only that before this particular revolution there was another revolution, and before that revolution another, and so on without end, successively in one and the same subject. That is, whenever a revolution occurs, another precedes it in that subject and another follows it, and this succession proceeds without end, just as in the future.

We say only that after this revolution there will be another, and after that another, and so on without end. We do not say that after this revolution there will be an infinite number of revolutions. For this would entail that there would be infinitely many revolutions after a point ten thousand years beyond today’s revolution, and also after the revolution indicated now. Thus one infinity would be greater than another, which is impossible. The same applies to past revolutions.

Their statement that the difference between what is past and what is to come is that what is to come has not yet entered into