meant that they have no end, but rather that they have no beginning. This is correct, and it is the starting point of the dispute.

The opponent says: If motions have no beginning, this means that a beginningless succession has elapsed in the past, just as it is said that an endless succession will occur in the future. This is precisely his position; what, then, is the proof that it is false? There is equivocation and ambiguity here in both wording and meaning; once these are distinguished, the meaning becomes clear.

The expression “entering existence” may encompass both that whose existence is complete and that whose existence is incomplete, as well as what exists simultaneously and what exists successively. But in the opponent’s view, saying that the past has entered existence whereas the future has not draws a distinction that has no bearing on the argument. For the arguments denying the possibility of the continuance of what is infinite—such as those based on correspondence, evenness and oddness, and so forth—apply to both cases. Since they are invalid in one, they must also be invalid in the other. Those who believed them valid without qualification, such as Abū al-Hudhayl and Jahm, applied them consistently to both past and future. This contradicts the religion of the Muslims and that of the adherents of other faiths.

What these would-be philosophers mention applies only to things that have passed away and no longer exist, such as motions. As for human souls existing together, if they maintain that infinitely many of them now exist simultaneously and that their number continues to increase, then what they have said concerning motions does not apply to this case.

For this reason, Ibn Rushd sought to evade this difficulty by holding that souls are one in essence, likening them to light in relation to the sun—yet light is an accident. The falsity of this view is well known, but this is not the place to discuss it at length.