is preceded by possibility, which must have a substrate; thus, an originated thing must have a substrate.

He said:

“They may also be asked: If an existent comes into being from nonexistence, to what does the agent’s act relate? In their view, it does not relate to something that has already come fully into existence. It must therefore relate to an entity intermediate between nonexistence and existence. This is what compelled the Muʿtazila to say that some entity exists in pre-eternity.

“They too—meaning the Muʿtazila—must admit the existence of what is not actually existent. Both groups are compelled to affirm the existence of a void.”

I say:

This is the well-known objection concerning the agent’s act, the originator’s bringing into being, and the like: if it is said that it relates to a thing while it is nonexistent, this would entail its being both existent and nonexistent. If it is said that it relates to it when it exists, this would entail bringing into existence what already exists, and its existing twice.