We have discussed this at length elsewhere and shown that clear reason compels them to affirm that occurrences arise from a complete, eternal cause that necessarily produces its effect. This holds whether they arise from it through intermediaries that necessarily accompany it or without intermediaries, and whether those intermediaries are called intellects and souls or something else. It also holds whether the first thing to proceed from it is said to be the element, as some maintain, or the intellect, as others maintain. For the intermediaries that necessarily accompany it are eternal alongside it, and nothing comes into existence within them: the argument concerning anything that comes into existence within them is the same as that concerning other occurrences.

They maintain that the celestial sphere’s movements result from the successive arising of the soul’s conceptions and volitions, while these arise from the Necessary Existent in Himself through the intellect that necessarily accompanies Him, or without the mediation of the intellect. Alternatively, they maintain that these arise from the intellect. These and similar claims, which attribute occurrences to a complete, eternal efficient cause in which nothing has come into existence, imply that occurrences arise from a complete cause in which nothing comes into existence.

Thus, if there is a complete, eternal efficient cause—whether or not that is made a condition for something else to come into existence—and if it is impossible for an occurrence to arise from it, then the coming into existence of what they call preparedness and conditions requires a complete cause.

This entails the simultaneous existence of infinitely many causes and effects, as al-Rāzī mentioned. This is among his sound arguments.

As for the answer given by al-Urmawī, which he described as brilliant, it is taken from al-Rāzī’s discussion in al-Matālib al-‘Āliya and other works. This counterargument refutes it, although it is an answer