reporting that they do not hold that reason judges things good or evil, as al-Rāzī and others have related.

If, then, the speculative theologians who hold that reason judges things good or evil, that there is no path to knowledge except through it, and that it makes such knowledge obligatory—meaning for those who have attained discernment—nevertheless say that revelation has explained these rational paths, directed people to them, pointed them out, reinforced them, and established them firmly, so that through revelation the proof against creation has been fully established, then they have made what revelation brings encompass what reason seeks, but not vice versa. Thus, beneficial rational arguments have become part of revelation. What, then, of the other groups engaged in rational inquiry? The philosophers have likewise stated this, as did Abū al-Walīd ibn Rushd the Grandson when he divided people into four classes, as will be discussed below.

[Section. Ibn Rushd’s discussion in Manāhij al-adillah (Methods of Proof) and Ibn Taymiyyah’s commentary on it]

Section.
Ibn Rushd’s discussion in Manāhij al-adillah (Methods of Proof) and Ibn Taymiyyah’s commentary on it

We have discussed, as far as possible, the paths people take to knowledge of Allah, so that it may be understood that there is considerable scope in this matter. Whatever people need to know, such as faith in Allah and His Messenger, Allah makes the paths to it plentiful and easy, although people differ enormously in this respect.

The matter is not as many speculative theologians imagine: that faith in Allah and His Messenger can be attained only through a particular path they prescribe. Indeed, the error arising from that path may contradict the very reality of faith. Likewise, many of them mention numerous views, while the view