of his deliverance, he is obliged to consider the matter, whether the passing thought comes from an angel or from Satan.

“Thus, it is established that such prompting does not depend upon a report from heaven. Furthermore, it follows that knowledge of temporal origination and eternity likewise requires a prompt; yet this is a rational thought, and one does not say that it depends upon a prompting from revelation.”

He said:

“It was argued that the Muslim community unanimously agrees that moral responsibility depends upon reaching puberty, whereas reason is not characterized by such a threshold. When a boy experiences a wet dream, he does not acquire a new faculty of reason; rather, he possessed that same reason before reaching puberty. Thus, it is clear that reason neither imposes any obligation nor prohibits anything.”

He said:

“The answer is that the responsibility contingent upon reaching puberty concerns obligations established by revelation alone. As for rulings known through reason, they become binding upon a person once he has acquired sufficient reason to distinguish between good and evil. We therefore do not concede their claim.”

I say:

This is the position of many Hanafīs and theologians—Muʿtazilīs and others—who affirm that reason discerns good and evil. They hold two views concerning obligation before puberty. Many who affirm that reason discerns good and evil, together with those among the four schools who deny this, deny that obligations apply before puberty.

A number of Hanafī authors have stated in their works that the view that faith is obligatory on rational grounds is reported from Abū Hanīfa. Al-Hākim al-Shahīd related in al-Muntaqā