a complete cause, and the coming into existence of that complete cause entails the coming into existence of a complete cause for it. This would entail the simultaneous existence of infinitely many causes and effects, which is impossible.
As for his statement:
“If by ‘cause’ you mean the complete cause, its coming into existence does not establish that the efficient causal agent has come into existence. Rather, it establishes either that the agent has come into existence or that some of its conditions have done so.”
The reply is:
This distinction is valid when considering what comes into existence in general. But when considering an occurrence that cannot arise from a complete cause, a complete cause for it must come into existence.
If someone says:
“The eternal agent brought it into existence when the condition for its coming into existence arose,”
The reply is:
The same question arises concerning the coming into existence of that condition as concerning the coming into existence of what depends upon it. Something must therefore come into existence that does not arise from the complete cause. For nothing can come into existence from an eternal complete cause: its effect must coexist with it from eternity, whereas what comes into existence does not coexist with it from eternity.
If it is said:
“It arose from it when preparedness and the conditions came into existence,”
The reply is:
The argument concerns everything supposed to come into existence from a complete cause that necessarily entails its effect. It is impossible for anything to come into existence from a complete cause that necessarily entails its effect.
This argument is valid, and the philosophers cannot evade it.
If they say:
“Things arose from it in succession, one after another,”
They are answered:
Things occurring in succession cannot proceed from a complete cause, because an eternal complete cause necessarily entails its effect, which would therefore coexist with it from eternity. Yet successive occurrences do not coexist with it from eternity.