Second: An essence does not vary in its capacity—or incapacity—to exist, since this holds at all times.

The reply to the sixth is twofold:

First: Since the two alternatives were equal in relation to Him, the occurrence of either without a determining factor would be a matter of chance. The same would then be possible for all other things that come into existence, which would entail denying the Maker.

Second: Since the two alternatives were equal in relation to Him, if the predominance of one did not depend upon some determination on His part, it would occur without His bringing it about—indeed, without any cause—which would entail denying the Maker. If it did depend upon such a determination, the same alternatives would arise concerning that determination: was it present in eternity past or not?

As for the cases of the fleeing man and the thirsty man, we know that neither will prefer one alternative unless he develops an inclination toward it.

I say: Some of these arguments are true and cannot be evaded; others require discussion that has been set out at length elsewhere, since the purpose here is to present the answers people have given to that objection.

Then al-Rāzī said:

The reply is that this entails the perpetual existence of the first effect, because the Necessary Existent must exist perpetually, and the perpetual existence of the second because the first exists perpetually, and so on—even if this rules out coming into existence altogether.

He said:

If you say: The Necessary Existent’s emanation is universal, but an effect’s coming into existence from Him depends upon the emergence of dispositions in receptive subjects through the motions of the celestial spheres and planetary configurations; thus, everything that comes into existence is preceded by another, with no first member of the sequence.