Second: It is impossible for the object of knowledge to become determinate. It is therefore rationally impossible to bring it into existence at a time when He knew it would not come into existence, or not to bring it into existence at a time when He knew it would come into existence. This entails that He is a necessitating cause by virtue of His essence.

The reply to the third is twofold:

First: If the time associated with that benefit came into existence without an originator, this would entail denying the Maker. If it had an originator, the same question would recur concerning it.

Moreover, if that benefit were already present before that time, it would necessarily have come into existence earlier. Otherwise, if its coming into existence at that time were necessary, the same could hold in other cases, which would entail denying the Maker. If it were not necessary, the question would recur as to why that particular time was singled out for that benefit, resulting in an infinite regress.

Second: If, knowing that this time contained that benefit, He could not refrain from acting, He would be a necessitating cause by virtue of His essence. If He could refrain, and the act depended upon a determining factor, an infinite regress would follow. Otherwise, something contingent would occur without a determining factor.

The reply to the fourth is twofold:

First: If what is designated by ‘eternity past’ were intrinsically necessary, it could not cease to exist. Otherwise, it would depend upon that which is intrinsically necessary, and the objectionable consequence would follow.

Second: Eternity past is pure negation, so it cannot prevent anything from being brought into existence.

The reply to the fifth is that it is impossible for something intrinsically impossible to become intrinsically possible.