in their understanding of their foundational principles.

Al-Rāzī said:

“The philosophers said: ‘The upshot of all these positions is to adopt the view that the full set of prerequisites for bringing the world into existence was not present from eternity. For he made its coming into existence conditional upon, first, the time at which the will was directed towards bringing it into existence; second, the time to which knowledge pertained; third, the time containing the hidden wisdom; fourth, the elapsing of eternity past; fifth, the time at which its existence was possible; and sixth, the preference exercised by the agent possessing power. None of these existed from eternity, and we have already refuted this alternative.’”

He then said, reporting the philosophers’ arguments:

“The detailed reply to the first is twofold:

First: If His will could not have been directed towards bringing it into existence at other times, He would be a necessitating cause by virtue of His essence, and the eternity of the world would follow. If it could have been, then, if favouring certain times by directing His will towards them did not depend on a determining factor, something contingent would occur without a determining factor. If it did depend on one, the same question would recur concerning that factor, resulting in an infinite regress.

Second: If His will’s being directed towards bringing it into existence were not conditional upon a particular time, the object of His will would necessarily be eternal. If it were conditional upon that time, that time would have been present from eternity. Otherwise, the question would recur as to how it was brought into existence, resulting in an infinite regress.

The reply to the second is twofold:

First: Knowledge follows what is known, which in turn follows the will; hence the will cannot follow knowledge.