in the earlier scriptures, then sees him and observes his distinctive characteristics, knows that this is the very one, since no one else shares those attributes.

This recognition may come through seeing him in person, as with those who saw him, or through other means by which his identity is known. For example, one knows that the Quran was received from him, that he migrated from Mecca to Medina and died there, that he is the one mentioned in the call to prayer, that he is the one Muslims call Muhammad, the Messenger of Allah, and that he brought this religious law which Muslims follow. Through these matters, his particular identity is known without seeing him.

Likewise, the particular identities of his caliphs, his Companions, and other people may be known, along with their words, deeds, and other circumstances, through knowledge specific to them that admits of no confusion with others, even without seeing them.

Individual human beings have, however, been observed, and it is known that these belong to this kind. Yet nothing has been observed that resembles the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and his caliphs in every respect; what has been observed resembles them only in certain respects. This aspect of the entity referred to is thus known by observing something comparable to it.

As for the distinguishing aspect, it must share some other attribute with something else, so that the common element between the two is also known.

Things beyond observation can therefore neither be known nor made known except through their resemblance to things that are observed. Yet if someone who knows some of an entity’s attributes knows that these are not shared by anything else, he knows it to be a single, particular entity. If he allows that they may be shared, he does not know that entity’s particular identity.