the evidence.

This has been discussed at length elsewhere, where it was explained that a simple, non-composite conception cannot be sought through a definition. Rather, what is sought through a definition is something of which one is already aware in some respects, with the aim of becoming aware of it in another respect.

For this reason, a definition alone does not make the thing defined known unless one knows that the definition corresponds to it. Yet one cannot know this without knowing the thing defined; otherwise, a mere claim is of no benefit.

The same applies to syllogistic evidence. If one says:

“Every intoxicant is wine, and all wine is forbidden,”

one cannot know the conclusion without knowing the two premises.

When something serves as a sign of a particular thing—for example, when a particular star, such as Polaris, indicates the direction of the Kaaba—one must already recognize Polaris, know that it lies to the north, and know that the particular direction of the Kaaba lies to the south. Then, upon seeing Polaris, one knows that the direction of the Kaaba is opposite it.

Without prior knowledge of the evidence, namely Polaris, and of what it indicates, namely the direction of the Kaaba, one could not draw this inference.

Rather, one first knew both the evidence and what it indicates. Then what it indicates—the direction of the Kaaba—became unclear at certain times and places. Upon seeing the evidence, one recognized what it indicates, of which one had become ignorant after previously knowing it. This is like someone who hears a caller calling out the name of a person he is seeking, such as his son or brother, whose whereabouts he has lost track of. Upon hearing the name, he takes it as an indication of the person named, whom he already knew, but concerning whom he subsequently became ignorant in some respect.

Thus, the signs that point to the Lord Most High are His verbal signs, which He has spoken, such as the Quran,