And as someone who identifies the determining factor with the will has said:

‘The will entails preferring that act within one’s power to another. One cannot ask why the will preferred that thing to another, because, had it preferred the other instead, the same question would recur. On that assumption, the will’s being a determining factor would have to be explained by another cause. That is impossible, because its being a determining factor is an attribute inherent in it, just as knowledge’s being that through which its object is known is an attribute inherent in it. This is intrinsic to it. Since intrinsic attributes cannot be explained by a further cause, neither can the will’s being a determining factor.’”

He said:

“This answer is also invalid, because we are not seeking a causal explanation for the will’s determining role as such, but for its giving precedence to this thing over its opposite. Explaining its particular determination does not entail explaining its determining role as such. Do you not see that, when a contingent thing admits of either existence or nonexistence, we judge that neither possibility can prevail without a determining factor? Explaining this does not amount to explaining its very contingency. The same applies here.”

I say:

A parallel to this is the statement made by some of the Qadariyya among the Muʿtazila, the Shia, and others like them: “Allah Most High made the servant a choosing agent and created him as such: if he wishes, he chooses this act, and if he wishes, he chooses that act. Thus, he chooses one of the two by his own choice.”

They should be asked:

“Has He made him fit to choose, receptive to choice, and such that choice on his part is conceivable and possible, and the like—or has He made him choose this act rather than that one?”