[The Scholastic Theologians’ Views on Allah’s Will]

When he argued in al-Mahsūl for compulsion, and maintained that affirming it precludes the view that reason can determine moral good and evil, he cited this argument and said:

“This brilliant demonstration thus establishes that these events occur either by necessity or by chance”—meaning that they proceed from the human agent capable of acting.

He also said, in setting out this argument here:

“The central basis for establishing the Maker’s existence is the contingent thing’s need for a cause. If we allowed that one of its two possibilities could prevail over the other without a determining factor, we could not judge that any contingent thing needs a cause. This would close the door to establishing the Maker’s existence.”

He said:

“As for someone fleeing a beast of prey who finds two paths before him, we deny that they are equal in every respect. Even if we concede this, the person fleeing believes that one is preferable to the other in some respect, or becomes oblivious to one of them. But if he believed that they were equal in every respect, it would be impossible for him, in that state, to take either one.

“The proof of this is that when a person’s motives tend toward opposing movements, he comes to a standstill in every instance and cannot leave until a determining factor arises.