god but Allah.’” He did not say, “Until they say that their Lord is a Lord,” for they already knew that.

The messengers only commanded them to join knowledge of tawhīd (divine oneness) with knowledge of lordship and oneness. They refused, whereas those who affirmed divine oneness accepted. Thus He said concerning the believers:

“Those who join what Allah has commanded to be joined.”

And He said concerning the unbelievers:

“And sever what Allah has commanded to be joined.”

The messengers therefore have a role in knowledge of tawhīd, but not in knowledge of oneness and lordship, for each kind of knowledge has its own station. Reason, acquired learning, intermediaries, reflection, and inference have no determining role in this knowledge, since it is universally present both in those capable of reflection and inference and in those incapable of them. Had He required them all to engage in reflection and inference, He would have imposed an excessive burden upon them: not everyone is capable of reflection and inference, whereas everyone can possess knowledge by necessity. He therefore required of them that which spared them such an excessive burden.

The hadith of the slave girl is well known, and she was among those incapable of reflection and inference. The same applies to the simple-minded, the insane, and others: if you asked them about Allah, glorified is He, they would point to Him on the basis of what He had made known to them. Thus He made Himself known directly before imposing religious obligations, and through messengers after imposing them. For had He addressed them and unveiled Himself to them before imposing religious obligations, without a messenger, religious obligation would have been nullified).