I say: This answer is given by those who allow that divine acts have underlying reasons, as is the position of the Muʿtazilīs, the Karrāmīs, and others. Ibn ʿAqīl and others like him may agree with the Muʿtazilīs, just as al-Qādī Abū Hāzim, son of al-Qādī Abū Baʿlī, and others may agree with the Karrāmīs in explaining divine acts in terms of reasons.

He said: “The fourth answer: Beginninglessness precludes origination, for the reasons already given.

“The fifth answer: It was not possible before that time, but then became possible at that time.”

I say: These two answers, or one of them, have been mentioned by several scholastic theologians among the Muʿtazilīs, the Ashʿarīs, and others, including al-Shahrastānī. This is also al-Rāzī’s answer in some passages.

He said: “The sixth answer: An agent capable of acting gives preference to one of two things within his power over the other without a determining factor—like someone fleeing a wild beast who encounters two equally suitable paths, or a thirsty person who finds two identical cups.”

I say: This is the answer of most of the Jahmīs among the Muʿtazilīs. Al-Rāzī also gave this answer in Nihāyat al-ʿuqūl (The Ultimate Reach of Reason). In this book—which he regarded as his greatest work on scholastic theology—he said:

“His statement in the first objection is that all aspects of the Creator’s causal efficacy, mighty and exalted is He, must have been present from eternity. This entails that the world cannot come after the Creator, mighty and exalted is He.