and a starting point.’

This is like what they say about future events that perish, come to an end, and pass away, such as motions: each one perishes and comes to an end, while the kind does not perish or pass away, but continues forever.

As Allah Most High says:

“Its fruit is everlasting.”

And He says:

“Indeed, this is Our provision; it will never be exhausted.”

Thus, the kind continues forever and is never exhausted, while each individual portion of the provision that is eaten is exhausted and does not last.

When many speculative theologians recognized the ambiguity and lack of clarity in this premise, and that it had to be clarified at this point, they distinguished between the two cases. This was done by Abū al-Husayn al-Basrī, Abū al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī, al-Shahrastānī, al-Rāzī, and others.

They recognized that what was meant was whatever does not precede events as a kind, rather than individual events, and that this argument could only be completed by demonstrating that events must have a beginning and that an infinite succession of events is impossible. They therefore began arguing for this using the arguments we have mentioned, the objections to which we have discussed elsewhere.

For this reason, Abū al-Husayn, Abū al-Maʿālī, and others like them based this proof on four premises: establishing the existence of accidents, establishing that they are originated, establishing that bodies necessarily possess them, and establishing the impossibility of events having no beginning.

They made the conclusion: whatever does not precede events is itself originated. For this would then be self-evident, unlike the approach taken by many speculative theologians from among