necessarily originated.

As for what does not precede originated events as a class—that is, something supposed to have always coexisted with them, one originated event after another, and so on, just as it coexists with one originated event after another, and one perishing thing after another, throughout the endless future, so that it is conceived as neither preceding originated events as a class nor coming after originated and perishing things as a class—this is a matter of dispute. On this point, they have been opposed by the majority of adherents of religious traditions and philosophers, including philosophers who affirm the world’s origination and those who affirm its eternity.

I have seen in the books of many theologians—among the Muʿtazila, the Ashʿariyya, and others—that they took this premise for granted and treated it as self-evident. They confused what does not precede a particular originated event with what does not precede originated events as a class. The first is clear and known to everyone; the second is not.

Thus, at the very foundation of their religion, they ultimately arrive at this premise. They claim that this foundation is established by unambiguous reason, that through it they came to know the existence of the Creator and the truthfulness of His messengers, and that by it they refute those who oppose the religion. It is also on this basis that they have taken positions contrary to certain texts of the Quran and Sunnah and certain statements of the early generations, the imams, and the scholars of hadith.

Yet this premise is an ambiguous expression of general scope, whose application to one of its two cases is clear.