And if he says, “Its acting after not having been an agent is nothing but the existence of its effects; the act is the arising of a relation and connection between the two, which is non-existent,” he is to be told:

“The same can be said of what newly arises and subsists in it: it is nothing but the existence of that newly arising thing, and it is the arising of a non-existent relation and connection. The act is the arising of a relation and connection—a relation and connection between the two—which is non-existent.”

If he says, “This entails that newly arising things and temporal occurrences subsist in it, and that is impossible,” he is to be told:

“This begs the question. You have offered no proof that newly arising things and temporal occurrences cannot subsist in that which is beginningless; rather, what you have presented is supposed to be the proof of that very claim. If your argument for this can succeed only by making the conclusion a premise in its own proof, then you have no evidence for it beyond mere assertion.”

This amounts to someone saying, “Newly arising states cannot subsist in that which is beginningless, because newly arising states cannot subsist in that which is beginningless.”

If knowledge of the Maker depends on this argument, there can be no knowledge of the Maker. Indeed, the argument then amounts to this:

“The proof of the Maker’s existence is the coming into being of the sperm-drop and other bodies. The proof that these come into being is that newly arising things and temporal occurrences subsist in them. Anything in which newly arising things and temporal occurrences subsist has come into being, because anything in which newly arising things and temporal occurrences subsist has come into being.”

The argument thus ends in nothing but the very assertion under dispute, and arguing for it