by this that the beginningless entity or its inseparable attribute cannot cease to exist, or that a kind which continues forever cannot cease to exist? If he means any of these things, none of them supports his argument.

If, however, he means that no individual instance in the succession of instances of a beginningless kind can cease to exist, this is precisely what is disputed, and there is no proof that its ceasing to exist is impossible. Nothing beginningless has ceased to exist here. Rather, the beginningless kind has always existed, but one of its individual instances has ceased to exist as another succeeds it, as with acts that occur successively, one after another.

Thus, if what subsists in that which is beginningless is a kind that has always existed while its individual instances succeed one another, the kind has not ceased to exist. Rather, the same reasoning applies to its having no beginning as to its having no end. Just as the kind continues forever and does not cease to exist, even though some of its individual instances do, the same applies to its having always existed.

He is also to be told: When that which is beginningless acts after not having acted, is its having acted something existent or nonexistent?

If he says, “It is nonexistent,” this is a willful denial of sensory evidence and reason. For if an act is something nonexistent, there is no difference between the state of acting and the state of not acting, since sheer nonexistence cannot be an act.

If there is no difference between the two states, and there is no act in the state of not acting, then there must likewise be no act on its part in the state in which he claims it has acted, since the two states are identical. It must therefore not act while having acted, which combines two contradictories.