As for the first approach, there are several arguments.

First: Knowing that things come into existence, and inferring from this that the Maker exists, does not require knowing whether the sperm-drop contains indivisible atoms or matter, or whether these are eternal or have come into existence. Rather, the mere coming into existence of something witnessed to do so indicates that it has a cause that brings it into existence, just as the coming into existence of all other things indicates that they have such a cause.

If he says, “My aim is to establish that all bodies come into existence,” he may be told:

“In that case, you had no need to single out the human being’s coming into existence from a sperm-drop; this merely prolonged the argument. For the same proof that establishes the sperm-drop’s coming into existence establishes the human being’s coming into existence from the outset.”

In that case, al-Ash‘arī’s words would be those of someone unfamiliar with inference and rational inquiry, as his Mu‘tazilī critics maintained. For if adducing particular bodies as evidence must ultimately depend on a proof encompassing all bodies, it would have been better to present that proof at the outset rather than prolong the discussion—especially in a concise work intended to make matters accessible and easy to understand.

Moreover, knowing that observable occurrences come into existence is clearer and more evident than knowing that all bodies come into existence, and this is sufficient to establish knowledge of the Maker. Why, then, make it dependent on premises which, even if sound, would involve such prolixity and obscurity as would often result in either a failure to attain knowledge or the acquisition of its opposite