And if the relation is the same, then for it to hold with one of two otherwise identical things rather than the other is a determination without a determining factor.

If they say, “The will, by its very nature, singles out one of two otherwise identical things without a cause”—even though this entails favoring one over the other without any factor giving it precedence—their opponent can likewise maintain that one of two otherwise identical times is singled out for events to occur, rather than the other, without any determining factor at all. He can say, “It is in the nature of times to be singled out without a determining factor.”

If the Mu‘tazilites say, “An agent endowed with power and choice favors one of two things within his power over the other without any factor giving it precedence,” they face the same consequences as the others, and more severely so.

If these are a person’s views, and his ultimate argument for establishing the Maker and the dependence of whatever comes into being on someone who brings it into being is that events are assigned to one time rather than another, so this determination must have a determining factor, since determination without a determining factor is impossible—and he regards this as self-evident and necessarily known—how can he say that the existence of events without anyone bringing them into being, an act without an agent, or a crafted work without a maker is not self-evidently and necessarily known to be impossible?

Whoever denies that self-evident, necessary truths are self-evident and necessary, while treating what is less evident as self-evident and necessary, contradicts himself. His statements contain violations of reason and revelation that none but Allah can count.

This is unlike the lines of reasoning set forth in the Quran, which are supremely sound and straightforward.