This is the method followed by al-Qādī Abū Bakr and those who agreed with him. It is better, more direct, and sounder than Abū al-Husayn’s method.

That it is better and more direct is evident. It is sounder because Abū al-Husayn included among the premises of his argument that, if something comes into existence while its coming into existence is necessary, there is no more reason for it to come into existence at that time than earlier. Thus, no particular time can be fixed for its coming into existence.

As noted above, this formulation contains an ambiguity requiring clarification, which gives rise to a dispute.

If someone says to him, “Rather, it came into existence necessarily because of a cause that necessitated its coming into existence at that time,” he cannot reply, “There is no more reason for the cause to necessitate its coming into existence at that time than at another time.”

For his interlocutor can say to him, “Just as you have said that a cause which brings something into existence while its coming into existence remains contingent singles out one time rather than another, so too I say that a cause which necessitates its coming into existence singles out one time rather than another.”

If he says, “A necessitating cause does not single out one time rather than another, unlike a cause that does not necessarily produce its effect,” this may be answered in several ways.

First: the claim is rejected, for it is a bare assertion.

Second: one may say, “We do not concede that anything can bring something into existence unless it necessitates it; so long as its producing the effect remains contingent, it cannot produce it. This is because