anything that comes into existence does so either necessarily, or with both its coming into existence and its not coming into existence being possible.

He rejected the first alternative on the grounds that, if its coming into existence were necessary, there would be no reason for it to come into existence at a particular time rather than earlier. Its coming into existence could therefore never be fixed at any particular time, since it would be intrinsically necessary.

He had previously said:

“The existence of the eternal is necessary, and its existence cannot be necessary at one time rather than another. It is therefore established that it necessarily exists at all times, and that its nonexistence is impossible.”

There is no need for this division, nor for refuting this alternative by the argument they have given. For when someone says:

“Either it comes into existence necessarily, or its coming into existence is possible,”

he means either that its coming into existence is necessary in itself, or that it is made necessary by something else.

If he means the latter, this is not impossible. Rather, one may say:

“That which comes into existence does so necessarily by virtue of that which necessitates its coming into existence, not by virtue of itself. In other words, the complete cause of its coming into existence is present, such that its failure to come into existence is impossible.”

If this is said, it too establishes the existence of the Maker who brings things into existence; it does not negate it. Thus, affirming this alternative does nothing to negate the existence of the Maker.

These Muʿtazilīs, however, may dispute that a contingent thing becomes necessary when its complete cause is present. They say:

“No contingent thing or thing that comes into existence does so except contingently, or with its existence having precedence over its nonexistence—not as a matter of necessity.”