subsists in the essence of Allah Most High of matters connected with His will and power, with no end to them and with their succession established.

The point here is that, according to rational people generally, it is impossible for the contingent—that is, that which comes into existence—to prevail without a determining cause. If the contingent is identical with that which comes into existence, both are proofs of the same conclusion.

[That something should come into existence without an originator is impossible for several reasons]

If, however, the contingent is assumed to be broader in scope than that which comes into existence, we say: If the former is impossible, then something coming into existence without an originator is also impossible. Indeed, its impossibility is greater, for several reasons:

(First)

It entails the contingent prevailing without a determining cause. For everything that comes into existence admits of both existence and nonexistence: had its existence not been possible, it would not have existed; and had its nonexistence not been possible, it would not have been nonexistent before coming into existence. Its existence therefore entails its existence prevailing over its nonexistence, and that requires a determining cause.

[Second]

It entails its coming into existence being assigned to one time rather than another, and with one attribute rather than another. Assigning to one of two equivalent things something that distinguishes it from the other necessarily requires a specifying cause.

[Third]

The very knowledge that whatever comes into existence must have an originator is clearer, stronger, and more evident to reason than the proposition that the contingent cannot prevail without a determining cause.

Some rational people can conceive of this and know its falsity as self-evident, yet cannot conceive of the contingent or understand its need for