the soul’s conceptions, necessitating the origination of bodies.” This is inherently false and contrary to reason and revelation, as explained earlier. His best answer is a counterargument by way of refutation. He says:

“This argument entails that nothing in the world could come into being, contrary to what we observe.”

This counterargument is sound if the claimant maintains that the complete determining factor for every contingent thing existed in eternity, for sensory experience and observation contradict that. Their proof, however, does not establish this. Rather, it establishes determination in general, not the determination of particular contingent things, nor of every contingent thing.

This shows that their proof does not establish their intended conclusion: the existence in eternity of a complete efficient cause for a particular effect, such as the intellects, souls, and celestial spheres.

It is clear that their proof does not establish this. It establishes only that He has always been acting in some way. If that act is assumed to subsist in His own Self, rather than being an effect He produces externally, this would satisfy what their proof entails. Likewise, if this is taken to mean that He has always spoken whenever He wills, that too would satisfy what their proof entails.

And if it is said that successive volitions have subsisted in Him, as al-Abharī maintained, and that things came into being as a result of some of those volitions, this would also satisfy what their proof entails. For it entails that He cannot become an agent after not having been one. A proof establishing action in general does not establish a particular act or a particular effect, much less the totality of acts and effects.