until he knows what these men said, even though they may in fact have been mistaken. How much more, then, does this apply to the prophets’ explicit statements concerning divine matters?

If the doubt advanced by the esotericists, philosophers and others, enters his heart—that the prophets spoke through imagery and parables rather than disclosing realities, since no other course was possible—he must not accept this claim merely on their authority. Rather, he must examine the Messenger’s words, conduct, and all his other affairs, as well as the conduct of his Companions: do these accord with what such people claim, or do they establish with self-evident certainty that these people are making false claims about the prophets, deliberately or mistakenly—whether out of obstinacy or error? This is discussed at length in its proper place.

[Ibn Taymiyyah’s Comment]

The point here is that these theologians mixed truth with falsehood in their discourse, countered falsehood with falsehood, and refuted innovation with innovation. When they engaged the philosophers in debate over whether the world had a beginning and similar questions, the philosophers gained the upper hand over them upon seeing that they had followed this method—a method deemed unsound by the leading authorities in revealed religion and rational inquiry, and whose unsoundness even accomplished rational thinkers have acknowledged. These atheist philosophers therefore supposed that, if they refuted the theologians’ claim that a beginningless succession of events is impossible and established proof of perpetual activity, this would entail the eternity of this world and a contradiction of the prophets’ explicit statements.

This is profound ignorance. Neither the philosophers nor anyone else possesses a single sound rational proof that contradicts any of the prophets’ explicit statements.

On this question of whether the world had a beginning or is eternal, no human being can establish any proof whatsoever that the celestial spheres are eternal,