objection or reply from his own writings, as in the case of the outstanding reply mentioned by al-Urmawī, which he took from al-Matālib al-ʿĀliyah.

The objections that he and others raised against his argument for the impossibility of a beginningless succession of events had already been mentioned by al-Rāzī in al-Mabāhith al-Mashriqiyyah, and by al-Āmidī as well.

I have therefore shown students of knowledge who are taken in by these men’s arguments their true situation, and shown that these very men elsewhere criticized the argument in which they followed their masters among the Muʿtazilī and Ashʿarī speculative theologians, raising objections that they themselves left unanswered.

Let no one suppose that what they have presented supports the religion of Islam. Rather, it deepens Muslims’ understanding of the early generations’ and leading scholars’ condemnation of speculative theology, and of the fact that it is ignorance, not knowledge.

Nor should anyone be deceived by how frequently authors writing on speculative theology repeat this argument, or by the fact that others follow them uncritically in it. For a person undertaking inquiry either examines matters for himself until the truth becomes clear to him, or follows the one protected from error: these are two paths to knowledge. Alternatively, he may place his trust in earlier masters of this innovated speculative theology. Yet these men have been opposed by others more knowledgeable than themselves.

The early generations and leading scholars opposed them. Their astute followers who critically examined their arguments opposed and contradicted them; their followers who critically examined their arguments opposed and contradicted them; and the philosophers likewise opposed and contradicted them.