produced by it, cannot conceivably coexist with it in time. It is conceivable, however, that action proceeds from it successively, so that the things it produces proceed from it one after another.

These thinkers laid down a false principle that exposed the falsity of their position: a complete cause, also called a complete causal agent, must coexist in time with its effect, such that the effect does not follow after it; and no effect can exist without a complete cause.

They used this to oppose the Jahmī and Mu'tazilī theologians, and those who agreed with them that the effect of a complete causal agent may—indeed, sometimes must—be delayed after it. These theologians said, “The Creator was a complete causal agent in eternity past, yet His effect was delayed after Him.” The former replied, “Rather, His effect must coexist with Him in time.”

The correct position is a third one: complete causation by an agent necessarily entails the effect, so that the effect follows immediately upon it, neither coexisting with it nor being delayed after it. Thus one says: “I broke the vessel, and it broke; I cut the rope, and it was severed; I divorced the woman, and she became divorced; I emancipated the slave, and he became free.”

Allah Most High says:

“His command, when He wills a thing, is only to say to it, ‘Be,’ and it is.”

Thus, when He brings something into being, it exists immediately after the Lord brings it into being, neither simultaneously with His bringing it into being nor after any delay. It may also be said that it exists simultaneously with His bringing it into being, meaning that it follows immediately upon it without delay.

Whatever He—glory be to Him—wills comes to be, its existence being necessitated by His will and power; and whatever He does not will does not come to be, because He has not willed it. Accordingly, everything other than Allah Most High must have a beginning and be preceded by nonexistence, for it comes into being only immediately after His bringing it into being,