and the second could not exist until the first effect existed. The same applies to dependence.

Yet it was never valid, at any time whatsoever, to say that the last member depended on the existence of infinitely many things, or required an infinite series to be traversed before it could be reached. Rather, whatever time you posit, you will find only finitely many things between it and the coming into being of the last member. This is its condition at every time—especially since, in your view, the aggregate and each individual are one and the same. If, by this dependence, you mean that this member came into existence only after things had existed, each at a different time, whose number cannot be counted, and that this is impossible, then this is precisely the disputed question: is it possible or impossible? How, then, can it serve as a premise for disproving itself? Merely by rewording it without changing its meaning?’

They said:

‘Thus, consideration of what we have drawn attention to requires that the Maker, whose existence is necessary, stand in unvarying relations to times, to the things that come into being from Him in a primary manner, and to whatever follows intrinsically and necessarily from that consideration—except for what necessarily results from differences: it arises when they do, and change follows them.’