it cannot arise arbitrarily.

Likewise, no nature or anything else can arise without a new state coming about. How could a will arise on account of a newly occurring state, when the case of that state is the same as that of whatever its occurrence prepares the way for, which then also occurs? If nothing new occurred, His state—as long as nothing new occurred—would remain one continuous state, following the same course. It makes no difference whether you attribute the new occurrence to something becoming possible or to something being removed: for example, to the act’s being good at a certain time, to its becoming possible, to a particular time, or to any other factor enumerated; or to the disappearance of some badness the act would have had, of an impediment, or of something else that existed and then ceased to exist.

They said:

‘If the motive for keeping the Necessary Existent from pouring forth goodness and bounty is that the effect must necessarily be preceded by nonexistence, then this motive