I say:

This is the position of those who hold that the world is eternal and necessary in itself, with nothing else necessitating its existence. It is the apparent and widely known position of the Dahriyya (eternalists), and the arguments of their most accomplished thinkers ultimately come back to it. Thus, the leading early theologians among the Mu‘tazila, the Ash‘arīs, and others—such as Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbā’ī and his peers, Judge Abū Bakr, Judge Abū Ya‘lā, and their peers—attribute no other position to the Dahriyya.

As for the position mentioned by Ibn Sīnā—that the world is the effect of a necessary cause that brought it into existence—this is his position and that of philosophers like him.

This position has also been attributed to Proclus, and his fellow philosophers disputed it with him. He offered no sound argument to establish it against them. Rather, he argued against them using the argument he had advanced against them in his discussion of the oneness of the Necessary Existent: that He cannot possess attributes, since that would entail multiplicity in Him, and cannot be a body, since that too would entail multiplicity in Him.

He denied the five kinds of what he called composition, such as the composition of a body from its sensible parts—indivisible substances—and from its intelligible parts, namely matter and form; composition from essence and attributes; from the general and the specific; and from existence and quiddity.