another passage, when he discussed the dispute concerning creative origination and the world’s coming into being. He said at its conclusion:

“These, then, are the doctrines. It is for you to assess them with your reason, not your desires, after affirming that the Necessary Existent is one.”

Al-Rāzī did not understand the point of his injunction, and said:

“If its purpose is to command steadfast adherence to monotheism, then it is unrelated to the question of temporal origination and eternity. If, however, its purpose is to provide the premise through which the truth concerning eternity and temporal origination becomes apparent, then it is weak, because affirming that the Necessary Existent is one has absolutely no bearing on this. Those who uphold eternity say: It has been established that all contingent beings depend upon that which necessarily exists in itself. Whether the Necessary Existent is one or more than one, its necessary existence entails that its effects and acts are perpetual.

“As for those who uphold temporal origination, none of their proofs depends on whether the Necessary Existent is one or two. It is thus established that the question of eternity and temporal origination is unrelated to the question of monotheism.”

I say: By monotheism, Ibn Sīnā does not mean the monotheism brought by the Messengers: worshipping Allah alone, without any partner, which also entails that none but Him is the Lord of any contingent being. Indeed, his fellow philosophers are among those furthest removed from this