another to come into existence at one time rather than another requires a particularizing cause.

The falsehood is their denial of the divine attributes.

Ibn Sīnā combined these two elements into an argument that he turned against the Mu‘tazilites and similar speculative theologians. He did not merely repeat what they had said, but developed their arguments further, connecting them to the teachings of his eternalist predecessors.

To the first principle—that coming into existence at one particular time requires a particularizing cause—he added that anything contingent, even if eternal, requires a cause to tip the balance in favour of its existence. On this basis, he established the existence of the Necessary Existent. This is the method he introduced into philosophy, combining philosophical and Mu‘tazilite arguments.

The Mu‘tazilites do not restrict the principle that particularization requires a particularizing cause to coming into existence. Rather, they apply it more broadly, making no distinction between necessary and contingent particularization. Ibn Sīnā agreed with them on this, and his principles consequently became inconsistent.

As for the unsound principle he adopted from them, it is the denial of the divine attributes. Since the Mu‘tazilites denied the attributes, called their affirmation corporealism and corporealism composition, and maintained that anything composite must have a composer, so that He cannot be composite and therefore cannot be