the eternity of the world fail to establish the eternity of the celestial spheres. At most, they show that Allah has never ceased to act, that something else must have existed before the celestial spheres, and similar conclusions that do not establish the eternity of the celestial spheres.

Then, even supposing this were established, his statement—“The mover of the celestial sphere must have necessary existence in its substance, and there must be nothing in it whatsoever, whether with respect to motion or anything else; hence it cannot be a body”—meaning that no action of any kind subsists in it—is merely an unsupported assertion.

Furthermore, why did he assume that no action subsists in it? And why did he say, “That in which no action subsists cannot be a body”?

One may respond: At most, what he has said establishes that his claim is possible. The reply is therefore: Just as this is possible, so too is its opposite. For if it is possible that the sphere’s mover is itself unmoving, then a mover that itself moves is all the more admissible and possible.

It may further be said: Indeed, what you have stated supports the opposite of your position more strongly than it supports your position. For if the celestial sphere is perpetually moving—and you have maintained that something else moves it—then its mover either moves or does not move. If it does not move, it moves something else without any motion within itself. This is either possible or impossible. If it is possible, their doctrine is invalid.

And if it is possible, then the celestial sphere itself either has necessary existence in itself or has contingent existence. If it has necessary existence in itself while its motion is contingent, and it depends for its motion