has contingent existence with respect to motion in place. Its mover must therefore have necessary existence in substance and have no potentiality whatsoever, whether for motion or anything else. Thus it is described as neither moving nor at rest, nor does it undergo any kind of change. Whatever has these attributes is neither a body at all nor a power within a body. The eternal parts of the world have necessary existence only in substance: either universally, as with the four elements, or individually, as with the celestial bodies.”

I say:

The purpose is to set out these men’s methods and the limits of their inquiry and knowledge, and to show that the best of what Ibn Sīnā and his like say was derived solely from the methods of speculative theologians, such as the Muʿtazilah and others, despite the religious innovations they held.

As for the method of the jurists mentioned by this man, it is far weaker and less useful in matters of divine knowledge than Ibn Sīnā’s method. For Ibn Sīnā introduced into philosophy teachings concerning divine matters, assembled from the methods of speculative theologians, philosophers, and Sufis, which clothed philosophy in splendour and lustre, enabling it to gain currency among many adherents of religious communities. This contrasts with the philosophy of the ancients, whose shortcomings and ignorance in matters of divine knowledge are plain to everyone.

These men’s discourse and knowledge concern the mathematical and natural sciences. Every learned person knows that the discourse of Aristotle and his like on divine matters is exceedingly scant, of little