‘A body cannot be necessary,’ that is an arbitrary assertion with no foundation.”

Ibn Rushd said:

“We have already stated that if ‘necessary existent’ means that which has no cause, and ‘contingent existent’ means that which has a cause, the division of existents into these two categories is not conceded. For an opponent may say: ‘It is not as stated; rather, no existent has a cause.’

“But if ‘necessary existent’ means that which exists necessarily, and ‘contingent’ means that which is genuinely contingent, the argument must lead to an existent without a cause. The argument is as follows: every existent is either contingent or necessary. If it is contingent, it has a cause. If that cause is itself contingent, a regress follows. The regress is therefore brought to an end by a necessary cause.

“One then inquires into that necessary cause, if it is also admitted that some necessary existents have a cause while others do not. If the cause is posited as belonging to the category of necessary existents that have a cause, a regress follows, and one ultimately arrives at a necessary cause that has no cause.”

He said:

“By this division, Ibn Sīnā merely intended to accommodate the philosophers’ view of existents, for the celestial body, according to all philosophers, is