it would have no cause, whether external to it or within it. If it had a cause because it was composite, it would be intrinsically contingent, and every contingent existent depends upon a necessary existent.”

He replied that no demonstration had established a necessary existent in the sense they claimed. It had established only that it has no efficient cause. As for its having neither a material nor a formal cause, no proof had established a necessary existent in this sense.

He said:

“All their obfuscation lies in these two expressions”—necessary existent and contingent existent—“so let us return to what is meant, namely the denial of a cause” (meaning an efficient cause) “and its affirmation. It is as though they are asking, ‘Do these bodies have a cause or not?’ The eternalist replies, ‘They have no cause. What is objectionable about that?’ If this is what is meant by contingency and necessity, then we say, ‘It is necessary, not contingent.’ As for their claim: